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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Point of Departure 
 
In my master thesis, I wanted to study the security of energy supply in the European 
Union, and EU’s relations to Russia regarding this issue. 
My interest for this subject was discovered after taking Dag Harald Claes’ lecture in 
International Energy Policy1 spring 2006 at the University of Oslo. 
The subject of Energy is a much talked about, and a discussed topic. It has been so for 
decades, and it is nor by far over yet. We find it in history books, in economics, political 
science and environmental issues to mention a few fields where we can find different 
aspects of energy discussions. 
In this qualitative research my intention is to understand and explore this phenomenon of 
energy security in the EU, and have by no means the will to try to generalize findings 
over to other areas.  
It is a highly descriptive and empirical study, where I want to see what the EU has done to 
improve or secure their energy supply since mid 1980’s in the EU, and since Russia is the 
biggest exporter of gas to Europe, I want to look at their relations, especially during the 
European Energy Charter and its negotiations, and (if) any repercussions it has had for the 
security of supply in Europe.  
In the lenses of International Politics genre, I will use Robert D. Putnam’s two level 
games in order to look at this interaction they have with each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1STV 4282b. 
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1.2. Three main subjects of this study 
1.2.1 The EU 
  
EU covers most parts of energy demand through import. Today, approximately 50% of 
the energy consumption is imported, but the number may increase up to 70% by the year 
2020. Security of supply has always been central in the work within the EU. Up until the 
end of the 1980’s this question was dominating in the field of energy. 
 
When concerning questions of energy there are mainly three main goals operating: 
 
1. The community’s ability to competition for the industry in general, and for the 
energy sector in particular, here under the Internal Market, a better competitiveness 
and increased employment. 
2. Safety for energy supply, here under reduced dependence to external sources, and 
secure on both long and short term. 
3. Protection of environment, here under secure that the energy policies merges with 
the political-environmentalist goals 
(http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/dok/rapporter_planer/Rapporter/2004/EUs-
energipolitikk.html?id=106083 (own translation.)) 
 
 
1.2.1.1 What has been developed in regard to ensure security of energy within 
the European Union? 
 
There have been several attempts by the European Union to better and secure energy to 
the Member States. They (read:the European Commission) have elaborated Green Papers 
since late 1980’s up until today, three of them; 1988,2000 and 2006 are mentioned later in 
this thesis. The Internal Energy Market, may be a measure in the way of liberalising and 
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opening the energy market, but is also seen as a way to secure energy. And because of my 
interest seeing security of energy supply in relation to Russia, the most significant 
measure is looking at the Energy Charter Treaty.  
There have also been a couple of other measures in order to get an agreement with Russia, 
as The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, followed by the EU-Russia dialogue.  
Because of the Energy Charter Treaty negotiations are most relevant here, it will be the 
focus of study, when I try to explain the relationship the EU and Russia have had during 
the course of negotiations with the help of the Two-level Theory, by Robert D. Putnam. 
 
1.2.2 Russia 
 
EU countries dependence of imported energy, in particular gas, is a result of a wanted 
policy. EU countries have chosen not to cover their own need for energy. This gives a 
price shock for the consumers, Russia increased political power, and pressure on Norway 
to deliver more gas. 
The failed energy policy does not only create short term domestic political problems 
inside the EU. In January 2006, the Russians closed down the supply of gas to Ukraine 
after a argument regarding the price. The reasons behind this can be that Russia disliked 
at that time, Ukraine government’s westerly policy. Ukraine is a transit country for 80% 
of the Russian gas that is exported to EU. This Russian action reduced the flow of gas to 
several members of the European Union. The Russian gas was used as a political weapon, 
something one can threaten with. This example has given the word, security of supply, a 
new meaning in the EU. Energy is a hot geopolitical topic.  
Russia’s president Vladimir Putin has himself declared that the country shall use its 
position as a huge energy producer as a fundament so that the country regains a position 
as a super power nation (Aftenposten, 13.07.06) 
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1.2.3 Natural gas supply 
 
In a book by International Energy Agency; Oil, Gas and Coal-supply outlook, they 
presented an increase in demand of global gas supply, which raised the question of 
whether, from where and at what cost this demand can be met. Although the global gas 
resource base is immense and reserves are abundant, gas is not necessarily easily 
available in any market or at any time. In contrast to the oil market, there is no global 
market for natural gas, primarily because the transportation of gas is difficult and costly. 
(1995:69)  
 
1.3 Problem of study 
  
In order to secure the energy supply to the European Union, from one of the EU’s most 
important exporter, namely Russia, have there been several efforts to try to meet this 
demand. There have been proposals, agreements, and papers in circulations within the EU 
and between these two, the EU and Russia.  
 
EU’s energy security of supply, and Russia’s energy policy towards the EU. The 
negotiations over the European Energy Charter Treaty- a successful two-level-
theory game? 
 
 
1.3.1 Propositions 
 
Have there been successful negotiations between EU and Russia in order to secure energy 
supply? 
Can this relationship be explained through the lenses of two level games, by Robert D. 
Putnam? 
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1.4 Line of demarcation in time and place 
 
I have decided that the study of EU’s energy security I will concentrate from mid 1980’s, 
when the Internal Market opened for the gas directive discussion, and Energy Charter 
Treaty started, and up until today. 
My main focus for this thesis is goal no 22, safety for energy supply. 
Regarding Russia, the focus of study will start after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
1990, and up until today. It will also as mentioned earlier, look at the relationship between 
the two, especially during the European Energy Charter Treaty and its negotiations. 
 
 
1.5 Research design 
 
The case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research. Case studies 
are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the 
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context. (Yin, Robert K.1994:1) 
 
I will in this thesis use qualitative case study research study of EU’s energy policy, more 
accurate, energy policy regarding security of supply. 
Svein S. Andersen (1997) claims that there is an understanding that case studies only have 
a limited value, when the intention is to generalize findings (own translation).  
Now, my intention with this thesis is not to generalize any of the findings, and do not 
consider this a challenge nor a problem. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See paragraph 1.2.1-three main goals operating within the EU. 
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1.6 Operational definitions of problem 
 
There are some terms that need more specification, an operational definitions of different 
aspects of my study is important, in order to make the reliability higher. The terms I will 
elaborate are; Security of supply, and negotiations. I first start by defining security of 
supply, followed by definition of negotiations. 
 
Security of supply as defined by Bielecki; ‘energy security is commonly defined as 
reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable prices. The meaning of reliable and 
adequate supply is rather straightforward: it simply means uninterrupted supply that fully 
meets the needs of the global economy. The interpretation of reasonable prices is 
somewhat less clear as it changes over time and is perceived differently by energy 
producers and consumers. In general, however, it means that prices are cost-based and 
determined by the market based on supply/demand balances. (Bielecki,Janusz, 2002:237) 
 
At the European level, the concept of energy security is defined by the European 
Commission in a similar fashion. The Commission states: 
 
Energy supply security must be geared to ensuring the proper functioning of the economy, 
the uninterrupted physical availability at a price which is affordable while respecting 
environmental concerns. Security of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-
stuffiness or to minimise dependence, but aims to reduce the risks linked to such 
dependence. (Haghighi, S. 2007:15) 
 
Security of supply has long been on the agenda within the EU. Already after oil crises in 
1973-74, witch led to the creation International Energy Agency (IEA), has security of 
supply been on the agenda. And when one look at directives in the period 1973-88, it is 
clear that much attention was directed towards security of supply, research and storage ( 
Matlary, Janne H.1997:12) 
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Negotiations; a kind of process where explicit proposals are put forward- and possibly 
discussed- with the official purpose of arriving at an agreement on some practical matter: 
the exchange or distribution of certain goods or evils, the establishment of some common 
good, etc. (Midgaard, Knut:2001:273). 
 
Definition of political bargaining can be said like this by Doron and Sened(2001);  
 
Scarcity shapes the science and practice of politics. Bargaining takes place when two or 
more players, individuals, organisations, parties, corporations or states- make a tangible 
effort to reach an agreement over the mode of allocation, distribution or redistribution of 
scarce resources.  
All political bargaining situations are characterized by some common elements. The most 
important are players, differences of interest, interdependency, time factors, rules of 
progress, agreed solutions and method of enforcements.(Doron, Gideon; Sened, Itai 
2001:2-4) 
 
 
1.7 Collection of empirical data 
 
I have collected secondary empirical data. I have collected and used literature from 
mainly books, newspaper, articles and web pages. 
The validation includes a critical discussion of the sources ability to give precise 
information. The books I have used here are open to the public, most of which have been 
borrowed at University’s library, and web pages are also of public information, so I 
believe that the validity concerning my empirical data are quite high. Literature and books 
that have been on earlier syllabus, has also been used in this paper. Former exam papers 
frequent also. 
Problems regarding validity, occur when one can’t measure the quality one has defined 
theoretically.  
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The validity depends on what has been studied, is it of relevance to the thesis and problem 
put forward (Hellevik, O. (Own translation)). 
Since the literature is open to the public, and there would be no difficulty recollecting 
them, I would be cleat that the validity of this thesis can be viewed as high. 
 
The reliability of my operational definitions, such as for the security of energy and 
negotiations, can also be considered high, this because I have put forward several 
definitions from different holds, and they are more or less expressing the same, but in 
slightly different words. 
 
Reliability and validity are important measurements, to see whether or not how accurate 
and precise the findings of the thesis are. The reliability is decided by how accurate the 
analysis is done. One can get high reliability by making operational definitions that 
defines clearly how the subject of study is executed. 
 
 
1.8 Theory; Two Level Games by Robert D. Putnam 
 
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level 
game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the 
government to adopt to favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing 
coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by 
central decision- makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign. 
(Putnam,R.D.1988:434) 
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1.9 The structure of this paper 
 
The first chapter of this paper is an introduction to my master thesis. Here I give a short 
introduction to the field which will be under study. There are three (four) main strands in 
this thesis, The EU, Russia and gas, put shortly, and the negotiations between the EU and 
Russia over the European Energy Charter Treaty. 
Chapter two presents my choice of theory for this paper, namely the ‘two-level games’ by 
Robert Putnam. 
I continue with, of course, chapter three, where I go more deeply into the empirical part of 
this paper. There are as mentioned in the introduction, several agreements, papers and 
negotiations that have taken place within the EU and in relation with Russia in the past 30 
years, which will be covered more or less in this chapter. 
In the fourth chapter, the main part, the analysis of the empirical data and theory is 
presented. 
And in the final chapter, number five, I give a summery and some final remarks of the 
paper. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ‘TWO LEVEL GAME’ THEORY 
 
 
2.1 Reasons for choice of theory 
 
I believe this is the best, of my knowledge, theory which can explain negotiations 
between two opposing, different sides, states or organizations in international politics, and 
in this particular case the EU and Russia.  
The reason for choosing this specific theory is because I want to look at the relationship 
that EU and Russia have had since the late 1980’s and up until today, and the negotiations 
over European Energy Charter Treaty that has taken place since the beginning of 1990’s.  
There are certain areas I will have focus on. There have been different agreements or 
discussions taken place between these two international players, the most significant is 
The European Energy Charter Treaty. 
 
‘Two- level games‘, was first presented in 1988, in International Organization, under the 
name ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two- Level Games’, by Robert D. 
Putnam.  
  
Explanations of interstate relations have traditionally been categorized according to their 
‘level of analysis.’ The level of analysis tells the investigator where to look for the causes 
of state behaviour by classifying competing explanations (or independent variables) 
according to the units in which they are conceptualized.( Moravcsik, 1993-5) 
 
This chapter and my choice of theory are based entirely on Robert D. Putnam article; 
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two-Level Games 1988, and Andrew 
Moravscik’s article in Double- Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics from 1993- which were edited among others, Robert D. Putnam. 
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2.2 Two- Level Games 
 
The two level games approach begins by assuming that statesmen are typically trying to 
do two things at once: that is, they seek to manipulate domestic and international politics 
simultaneously. Diplomatic strategies and tactics are constrained both by what others 
states will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify (Moravscik, A.1993:15). 
 
The two level games view the relationship between domestic and international politics 
through the eyes of the statesman (ibid:23). 
 
Putnam decomposes the negotiation process into two stages; 
1. Bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement; call level I. 
2. Separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the 
agreement; call that level II. 
It is important to be aware of the requirements that any level I agreement must, be ratified 
at Level II imposes a crucial theoretical link between the two levels (Putnam, 1988:436). 
 
2.3 Win-set models 
 
Each state is assumed to have a “win-set”, defined as the set of potential agreements that 
would be ratified by domestic constituencies in a straight up-or-down vote against the 
status quo of “no-agreement”. 
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           Figure 2.1 
      
 
 
           Figure 2.2 
 
 
 
Larger “win-sets” make Level I agreement more likely. Any successful agreement must 
fall within the Level II win-sets of the parties to the accord. As showed in box over, 
agreement is possible only if those win-sets overlap, and the larger each win-set, the more 
likely they are to overlap. Conversely, the smaller win-set, the greater the risk that the 
negotiations will break down (Putnam, R.D. 1988 p.438). 
Win-set for state A 
Win-set for state B 
B 
A 
Possibility to make an 
agreement 
 
No overlap between the two 
states, meaning-no 
agreement within reach Win-set for state B
A B
Win-set for state B 
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Another reason why the win-set size is important is that the relative size of the respective 
Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international 
bargain. The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be ‘pushed 
around’ by other Level I negotiators. Conversely, a small domestic win-set can be a 
bargaining advantage (ibid: 440). 
 
Putnam continues to underline the importance of the determinants of the win-set. (ibid: 
442) 
There are three sets of factors that are important to what circumstances affect win-set size; 
1. Level II preferences and coalitions 
2. Level II institutions 
3. Level I negotiators’ strategies 
 
Level II
 
           Figure 2.33 
 
                                                 
3 This figure was inspired after Ivar Tvede’s Master Thesis in Fall 2006 
 Level II 
Level I 
Org. 1 Org. 1 
Player 1 Org. 1 Org. 1 
Player 2 
Org. 1 Org. 1 
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The chief-negotiator is the only formal link between Level I and Level II. Putnam 
assumes that the chief negotiator has no independent policy views, but acts as merely as a 
honest broker, or rather as a agent on behalf of his constituents. This assumption 
simplifies the analysis of the two-level games. 
Because empirically, the preferences of the chief negotiator may well diverge from those 
of his constituents.  
 
The motives of the chief negotiator include: 
 
• Enhancing his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources or 
by minimizing potential losses. 
• Shifting the balance of power at Level II in favour of domestic policies that he 
prefers for exogenous reasons. 
• To pursue his own conception of the national context. 
 
It is reasonable to presume, that in the internationally case of two-level bargaining, that 
the chief negotiator will normally give primacy to his domestic calculus, if a choice must 
be made, not least because his own incumbency often depends on his standings on Level 
II. Hence, he is more likely to present an international agreement for ratification, the less 
of his own political capital he expects to have to invest to win approval and the greater the 
likely political returns from a ratified agreement (Putnam, 1988: 456-457). 
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2.4 Operationalization of Two-Level Theory 
 
How can this two level theory be applied to the empirical data of my thesis? 
 
In a hypothetical model based on two-level game, The European Commission will be the 
‘Chief of Negotitator’ (COG), this is because the European Commission work on behalf 
and in interest of all the European Member States. Head of the European Commission is 
the formal link between the game players on Level I and Level II. 
In this particular case, the Level II, will consist the European Union’s Member States and 
OECD Countries. The reason why OECD countries are taken in this model is because 
they are signatories of the European Energy Charter Treaty. They have a say it what can 
be agreed on in the Energy Charter Treaty as well.  
Other large gas companies within the EU must also be taken in account. Although it 
should be said that, these large European Gas Companies are not mentioned in the further 
analysis of this thesis. 
 
When the European Union is making new rules and laws there has to be unanimous 
consent from the Member States. This would mean that the domestic win-set on Level II 
(Home based level) can be smaller than the opposing side of the game.  
 
On Level I (the international Level), the European Commission meets the Russian 
Delegation to the European Energy Charter Treaty negotiations as their ‘Chief of 
Negotiator’.  
The Russian Delegation on their Level II must answer to the Russian Government, 
Parliament and gas companies.  
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It would be difficult to map out their respective win-sets in this particular (or any) 
negotiation process.  Although it may appear that the European Union is more open to 
change, than Russia. Meaning, that the win-set of the European Union is larger than 
Russia’s, which are not so eager to make change, especially when it comes to Third Party 
Access and Transit rules. These themes or rather; obstacles in the ECT negotiation will be 
covered in chapter four: the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
“We stand before completely new challenges in the energy market. The demand is 
increasing, Member Countries within the EU’s own production is falling, it invests too 
little in the energy sector, and we see that the climate is changing. We must face these 
new realities. EU can no longer have 25 (today 27) uncoordinated political perceptions 
regarding our energy policy”. (Barroso, Jose M. -Aftenposten 24 of march 2006. Own 
translation.) 
 
In this important empirical chapter, I will cover some important areas of EU’s energy 
policy, and its development that has occurred in the European energy policy since the late 
1980’s.  
On the road to safe security of energy, there are directives and agreements that one has to 
consider, and take into account. 
 
EU covers most parts of energy demand through import. Today, approximately 50% of 
the energy consumption is imported, but the number may increase up to 70% by the year 
2020. Security of supply has always been central in the work within the EU. Up until the 
end of the 1980’s this question was dominating in the field of energy. 
 
When concerning questions of energy there are mainly three goals operating; 
 
1. The community’s ability to competition for the industry in general, and for the 
energy sector in particular, here under the Internal Market, a better competitiveness 
and increased employment. 
2. Safety for energy supply, here under reduced dependence to external sources, and 
secure on both long and short term. 
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3. Protection of environment, here under secure that the energy policies merges with 
the political-environmentalist goals 
(http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/dok/rapporter_planer/Rapporter/2004/EUs-
energipolitikk.html?id=106083 (own translation.)). 
 
The means to accomplish these goals is liberalising the markets, a sound policy regarding 
dependence of import from third countries, propose a sustainable development, and 
support to science and development of technology in the energy field. Common rules are 
among other developed in the areas of oil, natural gas and electricity. 
 
On the other hand, the general set of rules are also currant in the energy field. This 
includes rules of competition, government subsidy and monopolies this means the actors 
in the energy markets must follow the general set of rules for competition, monopolies 
and government subsidy. 
 
The regulations of the Internal Market and environment, and further development of set of 
rules, also gets application in the energy sector. 
With an internal energy market with increased competition across borders, there is less 
room for national energy policy that diverges from the framework conditions in other EU 
member countries. 
 
Formally, the EU does not have a common or joint energy policy. One of the reasons is 
that the EU member states have wanted to keep energy policy at a domestic level of 
decision making. Also, it does not exits policies in the energy sector in the EU treaties, 
like those we can find concerning the common agricultural- and fishery policy.4 
(http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/dok/rapporter_planer/Rapporter/2004/EUs-
energipolitikk.html?id=106083 (own translation.))  
 
                                                 
4 Appeared in an earlier exam paper by me (STV 4230b  ) in spring 2006. 
 23
3.2 EU’S ENERGY POLICY FROM THE LATE 1980’S AND ONWARD  
 
Increased energy security in Europe has influenced EU co-operation from the start in the 
1959’s. two out of three founding European Community Treaties dealt with the issue of 
co-operation to ensure sufficient supply of energy. Early EC energy co-operation revolved 
around enhancing and improving coal and nuclear supplies in Europe. 
Security of supply has remained near top of the EU energy agenda, reflecting the general 
lack of conventional energy resources and dependency on imports from outside the area, 
and international events threatening to interrupt the flow of energy into the EU.  
 
In 1986, the common objectives established for community energy policy were; 
• Maximize security of supply and reduce the risk of sudden fluctuations in energy 
prices through developing the Community’s own energy resources under 
satisfactory economic conditions; 
• Diversify the Community’s external sources of supply;  
• Improve the flexibility of energy systems and, inter alia, develop, as necessary 
link-ups; 
• Develop effective crisis measures, particularly in the oil sector; 
• Create a vigorous policy of energy saving and the rational use of energy, with 
diversification between the different forms of energy (Eikeland, Per O. 2004:22-
23). 
 
In the early 1990’s, one could identify three main strands, when the European Community 
policy acting on the energy industries, security of supply, the environment and the drive 
for more competition in a free market (Lyons,P.1992:3). 
 
A statement presented at this seminar by Svend Kræmer( Deputy Head of the EC 
delegation to Norway) ; the European Community wished to play a part in consolidating 
the democratic changes occurring in Eastern and Central Europe and the effects of 
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perestroika in the Soviet Union. It was seeking to support the economic and constitutional 
reforms in progress in the Soviet Union. 
The energy sector in Central and Eastern Europe was faced with long-term structural 
problems, which had been further exacerbated by the Gulf crisis and the collapse of 
Comecon/CMEA5 agreements. Soviet sales of oil and gas to the Eastern bloc countries 
had become increasingly unreliable, but were now priced at international market rates and 
paid for in hard currency. Europe wide energy cooperation was therefore very much in the 
interest of the Central and East European countries. (Energy for Europe- resources, 
economy, cooperation (report from a Nordic Council seminar14-15 October 1991:22-23) 
 
As Svein S. Andersen sees it in his working paper for ARENA(2000:2); Energy issues 
have increasingly been linked to three general perspectives. First, the EU’s internal 
market program where competition policy plays a major role. Second, the EU’s  attempts 
to establish a common environmental policy with fiscal measures as key instruments. 
Third, the European Energy Charter and the Charter Treaty which were attempts by EU to 
create international market regimes that could support reform in the former East Bloc and 
thereby secure EU’s energy supplies. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON / Comecon / CMEA / CAME), 
(Russian: Совет экономической взаимопомощи - СЭВ), 1949 – 1991, was an economic 
organization of communist states and a kind of Eastern Bloc equivalent to—but more 
geographically inclusive than—the European Economic Community. The military counterpart to 
the Comecon was the Warsaw Pact, though Comecon's membership was significantly wider.The 
descriptive term Comecon was often applied to all multilateral activities involving members of 
the organization, rather than being restricted to the direct functions of Comecon and its organs. 
For example, this is the usage in the Library of Congress Country Study that is heavily cited in 
the present article. This usage was sometimes extended as well to bilateral relations among 
members, because in the system of socialist international economic relations, multilateral accords 
— typically of a general nature — tended to be implemented through a set of more detailed, 
bilateral agreements.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COMECON) 
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The adoption of the Single Act6 in 1985, brought a new and central priority to much of 
the Commissions administration, however, it was not until two years later, in 1987, wh
energy ministers agreed to let the Commission investigate the obstacles to a single market 
in energy. By 1988, the Commission had published its important communication, Green 
Paper, entitled ‘The Internal Energy Market’ (IEM) (Lyons,P.1992:7). 
en 
                                                
 
In May 1990, the Commission published its first progress report on IEM (COM/90/124). 
In it the Commission recognized that ‘the Internal Energy Market’ cannot be set up until 
the notion of security of supply has been defined. The role of the Community’s resources, 
the optimum degree of diversification of sources or forms of energy, the degree of 
competition to maintain in the market, the scope of the regulations on the production, 
distribution and the use of energy and the interconnections of networks all have to be 
defined(ibid:42). 
 
From 2000 onwards, energy security gained new topicality in EU energy policy, due in 
parts to fresh energy growth figures showing an increase in import dependencies and 
other figures showing an aggravation of the situation after the 2000 Nice Summit opened 
the EU up to new applicant countries from eastern Europe in 2004. The Commission 
could no longer deal lightly with the security of supply issue, and published in November 
2000 a Green Paper in which it announced the introduction of a broad security of supply 
strategy.7 
 
 
 
6 The EU Council adoption in 1987 of the Single European Act was a pivotal part of a reform 
aimed at revitalising the general principles guiding Community co-operation- removal of barriers 
to trade and movement of capital across member states and free competition as means to increase 
growth and welfare in the region. It strengthen supranational authority in a number of EU policy 
areas, opening for greater use of qualified majority voting in decisions on EU -wide market rules, 
thus removing blocking votes of member states sceptical to increased harmonisation of national 
policies (Eikeland, P.O, 2004:3) 
7 Green (COM (2000) (769) see own paragraph in same chapter. 
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3.3 The Internal Energy Market (IEM)  
 
To create a genuine internal market for energy is one of the European Union’s priority 
objectives. The existence of a competitive internal energy market is a strategic instrument 
in terms both of giving European consumers a choice between different companies 
supplying gas and electricity at reasonable prices, and of making the market accessible for 
all suppliers, especially the smallest and those investing in renewable forms of energy. 
There is also the issue of setting up a framework within which the mechanism for CO² 
emission trading can function properly. Making the internal energy market a reality will 
depend above all on having a reliable and coherent energy network in Europe and 
therefore on infrastructure investment. A truly integrated market will contribute to 
diversification and thus to security of supply (http://Europe.eu/cgi-bin/etal.pl; read date 
19.09.07) 
 
Although the Internal Energy Market also includes market of electricity, I will continue to 
focus only on the natural gas market. 
The objective of these common rules for the internal market is to gradually open up 
national gas markets to competition and to improve security of supply and industrial 
competitiveness (http://Europe.eu/cgi-bin/etal.pl, read date 19.09.07). 
 
The development  of ‘the Internal Energy Market’ which started, as mentioned above, 
with a package existing of four directives in 1989, continued with a new announcement of 
content in 1991, and expanded the internal energy market outside EU area in the 
European Energy Charter8 later same year. From 1988-95, the work to improve IEM, 
despite of extensive opposition from interest within the energy sector, and also 
governments. Even though the governments from EU member countries supported the 
idea of IEM, they had strong reservations about parts that directly affected their own 
national energy sectors. In other words, they supported the general concept, which they 
                                                 
8 See own paragraph later in same chapter 3.4..? 
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saw would bring benefits inside energy trade, but were cautious when it came to secede 
national control over energy policy. (Matlary, Janne H. 1997: 21-22). 
 
However, a package of proposals for specific energy directives needed for ensuring free 
and fair competition in the electricity and gas sectors was adopted by the Commission and 
sent to the Council of Ministers for approval in 1989. The Commission presented the 
package as a first stage initiative, to be followed up by new directives that would 
eventually lead up to the establishment of a ‘common carrier’ system for gas and 
electricity across member states. A common carrier system would entail a system 
whereby any consumer could purchase energy from any supplier, regardless of ownership 
of the intermediary grid structures. This initial package also proposed a less 
comprehensive system, however, a  ‘common transit system’ that would allow only 
national grid system operators to purchase electricity or gas across the territory  of another 
member state. Widespread opposition in the council to a common carrier system 
prompted the Commission to embark on a stage-by-stage procedure. 
 
There has been reluctance from the Member States to accept the idea of pooling their 
energy markets, particularly gas and electricity, and has been so strong that efforts to 
obtain their consent were doomed to fail for may years. The energy sector were labelled a 
-strategic sector’ but concrete policy advances proved difficult. The first success only 
occurred in 1996 with the creation of the Directive on Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in electricity followed by the Directive on Common Rules for the Internal Market 
in Natural Gas in 1998.  
This pooling together of energy markets being a new phenomenon, attention was centred 
on securing an efficient and well-functioning internal energy market. In regulating this 
market, the discussion of internal security of energy supply came to the fore and 
dominated various policy initiatives. However, the discussion of external security of 
supply, namely the design of an efficient framework to guarantee security through 
relations with energy-producing countries, was overlooked. Demand management issues, 
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such as energy saving, energy efficiency, stock-holding obligations, climate change issues 
etc were increasingly addressed at the Community level, but dependence on external 
sources of energy was left aside or only touched upon en passent for quite some time. 
This aspect of security remained in the hands of the Member States  (Haghighi, S.2007:4-
5). 
 
 
3.4 The Gas Directive 
 
The liberalisation of European gas and electricity industries, by means of creating access 
to transition and distribution networks along with the de-monopolisation of markets, and 
the abolition has been an extremely long process and in 2005 was far being either 
complete or successful in many, if not most countries (Stern, J. 2005:129) 
 
Virtually every stage prior to agreement in 1998, key principles of the Gas Directive were 
fiercely opposed by a majority of gas utility companies- and many important governments 
of major European Member States and most gas-producing companies. 
After lengthy discussion and negotiations, the first EU ‘Common Rules’ Gas Directive 
was finally agreed by Member States in August 1998. 
The Directive required the opening of markets to competition- so called liberalisation or 
‘de-regulation’- commencing in August 2000. 
 
The second Common Rules Gas Directive- the Acceleration Directive, was ratified by the 
European Parliament in July 2003, and provided for complete opening of markets by July 
2007, as well as further corporate separation (legal unbundling9) of network assets and 
regulated access to networks. 
 
                                                 
9 Definition of unbundling; separation of accounts for different functions of integrated companies 
(Stern, J. 1998/9:91) 
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Transmission, storage, distribution and supply of natural gas were regulated in this 
directive. The main aim of the directive was to achieve a competitive market in natural 
gas. Public service obligations could be imposed that gave leeway to Member States in 
applying the provisions of the directive flexibly for security purposes, only if they are 
transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable. Member States could undertake necessary 
activities to secure their own energy supply. Although the directive stated that the external 
supply of natural gas was of particular importance for the purchase of natural gas in 
Member States that were highly dependent on gas imports, no concrete measures to 
facilitate access to this supply at the external level was mentioned  (Haghighi, 
S.2007:105-106). 
 
This Directive was, as mentioned in previous paragraph, later replaced in 2003. The most 
important externality in this later directive is found in paragraph (5), where it is 
acknowledged that ‘in view of the anticipated increase in dependency as regard natural 
gas consumption, consideration should be given to initiatives and measures to encourage 
reciprocal  arrangements for access to third-party networks and market integration.’ 
This provision can be said to be directly linked the discussion of security supply and the 
necessity of considering the dependence of the Community on external sources in internal 
measures. The directive does not design a framework for such a reciprocal relationship 
with third countries. It only imposes an obligation on the Commission to produce a 
general assessment of progress in bilateral relations with third producers or transit 
countries (Haghighi S. 2007:106) 
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3.5 Green Papers of 1988, 2000 and 2006 
3.5.1 Intro 
 
There have been several Green Papers the last 20 years or so stemming from the EU.  The 
latest edition was Green Paper 2006. Previous is Green Paper 2002, and as early as in the 
late 1980’s. I cannot go into detail in all of these different Green papers here, but I will 
make room for a short summery from these earlier mentioned, namely the Green Paper 
1988, 2002 and Green Paper 2006. 
 
 
3.5.2 Green paper 1988 “the Internal Energy Market” 
 
The first draft to EU Commission’s ‘green paper‘10 was put forward in 1988, regarding 
implementation of an internal energy market in Europe. 
In a 1988 green paper entitled ‘The Internal Energy Market’, the Commission identified 
four procedures that would be applied in the creation of an internal energy market. The 
first involve implementing the general single market provisions in the energy sector ( i.e. 
harmonisation of rules and technical norms, the opening up of public procurement 
markets and the removal of fiscal barriers). The second involved the determined 
application by the Commission of already existing general EC Treaty Law, such as the 
general competition rules. The third involved finding a satisfactory equilibrium between 
energy and the environment, and the forth, the application of additional, appropriate and 
specific case-by case means (specific energy directives) to be adopted by the Council 
(Eikeland, Per Ove-2004:1-5). 
 
 
                                                 
10 ’Green paper’ is working paper that the European Commission is putting forward, to the 
involved parties. Sometimes they are followed up and lead to new laws and regulations. -
www.europaveien.no 
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3.5.3 Green paper 2000 “Towards a European Strategy for Security of Energy” 
 
The Green Paper of 2000 was entitled ‘Towards a European Strategy for Security of 
energy’11.  
This paper was at that time considered ‘the most important document reflecting the major 
concerns of Europe with respect to this security’ (Haghighi, S.2007:159). 
The Green Paper sets the goals of guaranteeing uninterrupted physical availability of 
energy products on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers while 
respecting environmental concerns and looking towards sustainable development 
(ibid:159). 
The Green Paper sketches the main pillars of a strategy to secure energy supply by 
focusing on (a) a demand policy, (b) real change in consumer behaviour through taxation 
measures, (c) the development of new and renewable energies, and (d) the analysis of the 
contribution of atomic energy (ibid:160). 
 
 
3.5.4 The Green Paper 2002 (Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament, Final report) 
 
The Green Paper of 2002 offers a clear strategy based on demand management. It has the 
merit of pointing out that the EU has little room for manoeuvre with regard to energy 
supply- due to its low, or in certain cases less competitive energy resources. 
The report continues, that the debate on the Green Paper has shown the need to develop a 
Europe-wide security of supply concept which alone will enable Europe to control its 
energy future. As emerged from the Paris, Brussels and Moscow summits, the dialogue 
the EU is entering into with Russia aims to create a new energy partnership. Hopefully, 
this dialogue will make it possible to determine the best future use off long-term supply 
agreements and production sharing agreements, on which the representatives of industry 
                                                 
11 COM (2000) 
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expressed some major concerns in the Green Paper debate (Final report 2002:1-5). 
 
3.5.5 Green Paper 2006 on a European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy 
 
The Commission, in spite of progress made with internal energy market since 2000, 
declared that there is a need to explore further avenues to guarantee energy security, 
competitiveness and environmental sustainability. 
The 2006 Green Paper highlights six priority areas for the Community to focus upon in 
order to obtain a secure energy environment: 
1) Completing the internal European gas and electricity markets, 2) solidarity between 
Member States, 3) stepping towards a more sustainable, efficient and diverse energy mix, 
4) creating an integrated approach to tackling climate change, 5) establishing a strategic 
European energy technology plan, 6) establishing a coherent external energy policy. 
 
In this 2006 Green Paper, the European Commission claims that in increasingly degree, 
EU must speak with one voice on the international arena. This in particular in relation to 
important producer countries, like Russia and Norway (EU-magasinet, 1-2006) 
 
3.6 Relating events 
 
Throughout the entire 1990’s the EU have aimed at market relations- within the EU and 
internationally- in order to gain security of supply. These last years development, with 
unrest in the central petroleum provinces and increasingly political rivalry between 
import- dependent states, has created a radical different situation. It is increased 
importance on political dialogue and cooperation, as supplement and alternative to 
multilateral institutional and market establishment. Attitudes like these was expressed on 
EU’s informal top meeting in Hampton Court outside London in October 2005. It was 
followed up by in top meeting in March 2006, with the proposals of a so called Green 
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Paper on energy. Officials of EU were highly occupied by/with the relationship to energy 
producing countries, in particular Russia, the largest gas exporter to the EU. Russia is the 
only one of the G8- countries that is also big exporter of oil and gas. This is a foreign 
policy card that they how to play. This can be witnessed by the negotiations with foreign 
companies that wish to participate in the Stochkman field development. At the same time, 
Gazprom seeks to enhance its position through an active downstream strategy, which 
would include the acquisition of companies in EU (Andersen, S. 05/06 2006:6).  
We could read in a follow up to this discussion in Aftenposten September 20th, 2007- 
under the headline, ‘THE EU will stop Gazprom’; 
The Russian company Gazprom has bought in eight gas transport pipelines. And now the 
EU Commission wants to stop this gas giant’s raid in Europe. So the day before this 
article was in print, the EU Commission proposed a suggestion which would entail that 
gas companies or electricity companies cannot own distribution network. This means gas 
pipelines or power networks. The Commission wants an ownership diving line, but is also 
open to that companies can own pipelines, but their operation are handed over to a 
independent company. In addition, will this be monitored by regulation authority. 
 
 
EU’s Energy commissionaire, Andris Piebalgs said at the press conference, that 
competition should be equal for those companies that are inside, as well as outside the 
EU. Therefore the new directives in EU obstruct that a company that is a gas supplier to 
Europe, also buys in to the gas pipelines. In the proposal to new directives, a company 
from a third country, prove that it is not connected to a production company. It is not 
good enough that a subsidiary owns the pipelines. Pielbalgs expressed that this was not 
directives directed towards Russia or Algeria. This was directives that would ensure EU’s 
internal energy market is working. The goal is that this new agreement can be passed 
under the French presidency in the second half of 2008 (Aftenposten 20.09.07). 
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3.7 Decision making in the EU in the field of trade. 
 
The legal bases for negotiations with third countries or international organisatins are to be 
found in the treaties establishing the European Community: Article 133 (trade), Article 
300(agreements with a broader scope than trade, or article 310(association agreements). 
In all cases it is the Commission that represents the Member States. It does nor act 
autonomously but on a basis of a mandate adopted by the Council. During the 
negotiations, the Commission and the Council is in continuous dialogue with each other 
through the Article 133 or other specialised committee. (Hill, Christopher; 
Smith,Michael.2005:72-73)                                 
 
    
           Figure 4.1  
(Source; Hill and Smith2005:72) 
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It is important to underline the factors influencing the price of natural gas and the nature 
of demand and supply. Generally large-scale gas consumption entails the installation of 
capital intensive gas using equipment (storage, gas distribution systems and so on) so that 
buyers need a guarantee of long-term supply over the period in which these capital costs 
can be recovered. On the other hand, because gas is costly to transport in liquefied form, 
suppliers usually need to install bulk supply lines to specific markets centers, and will 
look for the assurance of long-term contracted demands.  
There is therefore a concerted market pressure towards the use of long-term contracts for 
disposal of new gas finds (Weyman-Jones,T. 1986:128). 
 
 
These long-term contracts included ‘take or pay’ conditions which provided the 
guarantees for the multibillion dollar financing of the facilities. When the contracts and 
the financing were in place, construction commenced. Thus under the traditional system it 
was held impossible to build any significant infrastructure in the absence of long-term 
contracts which guaranteed adequate revenues to the producer and those investing in the 
facilities (principally the major transmission companies). In addition, the contracts 
provided a long-term guarantee that the facilities would only be used to transport gas from 
a specified source (usually, but not always, a particular field) such that the producer could 
not sell to any other buyer, and the buyers could not buy from any other source. If 
questioned about this system, the reply from all players was that this was the only way in 
which major developments could be financed (Stern, J.P. 1998/9:33). 
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3.8 The European Energy Charter Treaty 
3.8.1 In general 
 
In the effort to improve security of supply, maximize the efficiency of production, 
conversion, transport, distribution and use of energy is the objectives behind the European 
Energy Charter.  
On December 17, 1991, at a conference in the Hague, the European Energy Charter was 
signed. 
The signatories were all members of the European Community, Central and Eastern 
countries, Russia and all other states in the area of the former Soviet Union, the United 
States, Canada, Japan, Australia and several others. It embraces countries outside and 
inside Europe, east and west. 
 
The Treaty was signed in Lisbon on 17 of December, 1994, and was put into effect by 
1998. 
The Treaty would take legal effect when 30 countries have ratified it, which was expected 
in 1996 (Martin, Imai and Steeg, 1996:39-44). 
 
However, it was first in April 1998, after the ratification by the thirty countries had taken 
place, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and its protocol entered into force. 
The ECT sought to add protocols on nuclear issues, energy efficiency and hydrocarbons, 
but a compromise on these issues was difficult to achieve. The protocol on nuclear and 
hydrocarbons became too contentious and was put aside. Only the text of the ECT , along 
with the protocol on Energy Efficiency, was agreed upon (Haghighi, S.2007:191). 
 
The conclusion of the ECT and the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency by the 
European Communities and its Member States was deemed ’to help attain the objectives 
of the European Communities’. These objectives was explicitly revealed as allowing the 
members of the Common Wealth of Independent States and the Countries of Central and 
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Eastern Europe to develop their energy potential while helping to improve security of 
supply. Therefore, the ECT was considered a step in guaranteeing Europe’s energy supply 
(Ibid:192) 
 
The charter is not an operational document and has no compulsory effect. Rather, it sets a 
political framework for further commitments to be undertaken in specific agreements. The 
first such agreement, initially called the Basic protocol, was expected to establish only a 
general framework for cooperation; but the EU Council insisted that this framework 
should have a legally binding character, establishing precise rules of conduct to be 
implemented in the national legislation of the participants. This view was accepted by the 
other partners (Dore and De Bauw, 1995:5) 
 
By 2004, the Treaty had been signed by 51 European and Asian countries plus the 
European Union. Of those 51 countries, only five had failed to ratify the Treaty. This 
means that the majority of OECD states and former Soviet republics have ratified with 
notable exception of Russia and Belarus (Stern,J:2005:136). 
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3.8.2 Four Major Stages in the Energy Charter Treaty negotiations by Svein S. 
Andersen 
 
Svein S. Andersen has in an article, or rather a draft, contracted the negotiations into four 
major stages12, and I will here try to summarize the most important points to these four 
major stages in this paragraph.13 
 
The future of the Energy Charter Treaty is unclear, but Andersen says that it provides a 
framework for the international energy sector that is to be used more actively in the 
present pursuit of increased energy cooperation between the EU and Russia. It also plays 
an important role in the present discussion about bringing energy into the WTO.14 
 
The dynamics of the negotiating process and the space for outcomes were governed by 
contextual factors; political, economic and legal, which provided direction to the process 
and restricted the possible outcomes. 
 
The Energy Charter and the Treaty represents the first comprehensive agreements 
common to the East and West after the end of the Cold War. 
 
The negotiations over of the Charter Treaty demonstrated that international negotiations 
may have considerable dynamics of its own. The process takes place in context 
characterized by overlapping and competing hierarchical principles and rules. Actors 
invoke, activate, negotiate and reinterpret content and implications of various institutional 
elements, as well as hierarchical and horizontal relationships between such elements. In 
this way the process illustrates that the institutionalization of a new order is not only a 
                                                 
12 I was handed over this article/draft personally, and do not know if this has been published by 
this time. 
13 These four stages appeared also in my earlier home exam paper (STV 4230 b) fall semester 
2006. 
14 I will not to into the discussions regarding Russia’s application to join the WTO here. 
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question of deducing implications from a higher order institutionalized principles and 
rules.  
 
 
The collapse of communism led not only to erosion of traditional state roles in the Eastern 
European countries, but also inversion of state and market principles. Also in the West 
market ideology was on the offensive in the energy sector. The coupling between the 
Energy Charter Treaty negotiations and existing international agreements governing 
economic exchange reinforced this dynamic and limited the interest that legitimately 
could be expressed in the negotiations. Such elements provided the context for effective 
strategies in the negotiations.  
 
Stage 1. Vision and political mobilisation 
 
This stage lasted from the introduction of the Charter initiative in the summer 1990 to the 
signing  of the Charter in December 1991.  Andersen, in this draft, continues to 
distinguish between two different phases in this stage. The introduction of the Charter 
initiative and the Charter negotiations. 
 
The fall of Berlin wall in 1989 and the development in the Soviet Union created a need 
for a reorientation in the EU’s relationship to the East Bloc countries. The European 
Energy Charter was conceived by the Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers. The EU top 
meeting in Rome December same year decided that Europe needed a lasting co-operation 
in energy. The result  was a broad invitation to ‘all countries concerned’ to participate 
actively in the making of the Charter.  In the first round the continuation of the Charter 
initiative was mainly a question of winning support for a political declaration of 
principles from other participants outside EU. 
The negotiations over the Energy Charter were characterized by a general support for the 
overarching political objectives. At the same  time it was clear that increased economic 
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integration between East and West had to anchored in a market perspective. The 
Commission proposal appeared to be robust.  Most proposals and suggestions did not alter 
the main perspective. The emphasis on a European market as part of a larger international 
one, and the clarification of the relationship to other international one, only serve to 
support the core of the proposal.  Attempts to strengthen energy policy state roles and 
environmental concerns were more problematic. The issues of energy policy and state 
role reflected a central Russian concern, but also the relationship between a small number 
of energy exporters on the one hand, and the large majority of import dependent 
consumer countries, on the other hand. 
The signing of the Charter in Haag represented a milestone in the attempt to establish an 
international framework for energy. 
 
Stage II. From sector regulation to market regime: changing ambitions 
 
The second stage started parallel to the completion of the Energy Charter in the fall 1991, 
and it lasted until the spring of 1992. It took place in a situation characterized by 
increased dissolution in the East. Within the Energy Charter negotiations this period can 
be viewed as a search for a model that could serve as a basis for the institutionalization of 
international co-operation in the energy sector. For a while there was a tension between 
adherents of the political cooperation model, and those pushing for a more ambitious and 
independent market regime. 
 
Two sets of concerns dominated the discussions. One was how an energy regime would 
relate to other international regimes and established concepts of international law as 
defined in GATT(now WTO). The other was what such concepts implied for the 
participating countries, in terms of energy and general political concerns.  
 
A major challenge was to bridge between general market principles and sector problems. 
Another challenge was to handle the increased conflict potential that would arise when 
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negotiations shifted from political declarations to legally binding text that should also be 
consistent and under stable. 
 
Originally the Charter was not supposed to be a legally binding, except when articles 
were specified through individual sector protocols. This meant that there would be room 
for negotiations of details on the sector level. 
 
Stage III. Market reform and complexity: From idealism to Realism 
 
Stage III lasted from summer 1992 to December 1993. In this stage the negotiations may 
be regarded as a collective learning process where increasing complexity pushed towards 
a simplification. The question was not whether to go for a comprehensive market regime, 
but how to formulate it and how to deal with special problems of the former East Bloc 
countries. The fall 1992 was also the start of a comprehensive privatization program in 
Russia. At the end of this period, the fall 1993, the problems of Russian politics and 
economy were dramatized through the Ruble crisis and the dissolution of the Russian 
parliament by military power. Russian oil production fell dramatically. The problem was 
not only that foreign companies were unwilling to invest in Russia. Also domestic oil 
companies with available investment capital placed it in other economic activities (in 
Russia) or abroad. 
 
The Western countries had dominated the two earlier stages. Now, however, the countries 
from former Soviet and Eastern Europe tended to be more active in formulating their own 
problems. It became clearer that there was a major difference between the removal of 
barriers to market forces, on the one hand, and to establish fundamental market 
institutions, on the other hand. The EU, US and Russia increasingly became the active 
core in the negotiations. 
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Early in 1993 three elements increasingly appeared to be underlying the further 
negotiations that hopefully would be concluded within a few months. First, the agreement 
should be based on broad, but specific market principles, with little room for sector 
discussions. Second, it was decided that the Basic Agreement should be renamed the 
Energy Charter Treaty.  
The agreement should strive for ambitious market principles as a framework for long-
term development. Third, the problems which individual countries might have in relation 
to the Treaty, particularly in the former East Bloc countries, should be handled through 
transition arrangements that did not undermine the principles of the Treaty. 
 
Already since the summer 1992 a considerable effort had taken place to map the needs for 
transition arrangements in the former East Bloc countries. 
Originally, it was thought that all countries had to incorporate Treaty standards in their 
own legislation and regulation by the end of 1998. During the spring of 1993 it became 
clear that not all countries were able to do this, and, even worse, some countries could not 
even commit themselves to a specific implementation date.  
 At the conference plenary meeting (June 28- July 2 1993) Russian representatives 
expressed their wish to conclude the negotiations before the end of that year. There would 
be a need for exceptions over a period of time, but it was emphasized that Russia’s 
priority would be to attract foreign investment to assist with modernization and 
development of their energy sector. The Charter Treaty would be essential to that aim. 
 
In contacts between Russian authorities, the Energy Charter secretariat and the core 
countries of the negotiations-EU and the US- several possibilities for transitional 
arrangements were discussed. There were concerns that Russian inability to guarantee that 
its future legislation will comply with the investment rules of the Energy Charter Treaty, 
which was also strengthen by Russian parliament members. It was suggested that it could 
be difficult to gain acceptance for equal treatment between national and foreign 
companies.  
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In early October a new concept started to take shape, and in this process EU played an 
active role. It was a two-step approach. The new proposal gave equal treatment to all 
countries, but it introduced two stages in the negotiations. All countries should sign the 
part of the Treaty (T1) which covered trade and post investment. Here the principle 
should be full GATT rights and full equal treatment of investors. In addition the first 
treaty should also contain rules for dispute resolution.  
The break through for a new two-stage concept reduced complexity and removed the 
most important obstacle for a conclusion of the ongoing negotiations.  
At the same time this development represented another step away from the original 
objectives of the Charter initiative, namely the short- term reduction of uncertainty 
regarding access to resources and a stable environment for investment in Russia.  
 
 
Stage IV: Compromise and holes in the market system 
 
In the last stage it was specification and clarification that dominated within the framework 
that had been laid down in December 1993. This stage marked an increased weight on the 
removal of factors blocking trade and competition. Although the two-stage approach had 
postponed fundamental questions concerning market rules in the pre-investment stage, it 
still would take a whole year before the first Treaty could be signed. It was particularly 
four issues that took time, of which three were related to trade.  
First, it was the relationship to EU’s internal rules which, in certain areas provide 
exceptions, and which could be affected by the Treaty.  
Second, there was the relationship between EU and Russia, where EU in the bilateral 
agreement wanted exceptions when it came to trade with uranium.  
Third, the Americans would not accept that the signing of the Treaty automatically 
changed Russia’s position in relation to the Jackson- Vanik Act.15 
                                                 
15 According to the 1974 Trade Act of the United States, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, named 
for its major co-sponsors, Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-WA) and Rep. Charles Vanik (D-OH), 
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The forth problem was the strong was the strong opposition from Norway, the major 
Western oil and gas exporter, to formulation, which could threaten state sovereignty. 
 
After intense negotiations which lasted until the signing ceremony started in Lisbon it 
became clear that Russia would sign the Treaty. It was particularly important to EU that 
had initiated the whole Charter (and Treaty) process. Russia did not succeed in making 
changes to the final text. Instead they were allowed to make ‘declarations’ in a special 
document, which the Charter Conference supported. The Russian declarations concerned 
capital transfers and uranium trade.  
The Treaty was signed by a majority of the participating countries at the December 17 
meeting.  
Russia is still one of the few countries that have not ratified the treaty. This does not mean 
that the Treaty has no effect. It represents a normative framework that cannot be 
completely ignored. Presently, the EU wants to push for Russian ratification and an active 
use of the Treaty as a basis for further energy dialogue and cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
denied most favored nation to certain countries with non-market economies that restricted 
emigration rights. Permanent normal trade relations would be extended to a country subject to the 
law only if the President determined that it complies with the freedom of emigration requirements 
of the amendment. However, the President had the authority to grant a yearly waiver to the 
provisions of Jackson-Vanik, and these waivers were granted to the People's Republic of China 
starting in the late 1970s and later to Vietnam. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jackson-
Vanik_amendment) 
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3.8.3 From Russia’s standpoint 
 
As we now know, Russia has of today failed to ratify the Treaty, and by the time of 
December 2006, indicated that this was unlikely due to the provisions requiring Third 
Party Access(TPA) to Russia’s pipelines.  
(http://en.wikipedia.org./wiki/energy_ charter_treaty). 
 
In retrospect, the Russian delegation hoped that the Energy Charter would encourage 
investment activity in their energy sectors, an one official stated that’ it is our confident 
belief that his document will help Russia become a powerful and flourishing country…it 
will determine areas for development of energy for many years to come’. Delegates were 
also convinced that Russia needed the Energy Charter Treaty to buttress the short-term 
survival of the country’s oil industry and secure its ability to stabilize exports, thus 
ensuring the continuance of hard currency earnings(Dore and De Bauw 1995:23) 
 
However, representatives of the Russian Parliament and Russian companies and 
administrative bodies, were generally less convinced that Western investment would 
provide the solution to the problems of their energy industry, and were more concerned 
with protecting Russian economic interest. Opening markets to widespread Western 
investment in oil and gas was perceived as a danger, since Russia might thereby be forced 
to loosen control over its most strategic industries. Russian equipment suppliers could 
also suffer if incoming foreign companies stuck their traditional suppliers and were 
unwilling to use Russian equipment. Several economist and tax specialist see the 
necessity for temporary protection of the Russian economy in the oil and gas sectors, and 
believe that, given time, Russian products will be extremely competitive on the basis of 
both price and quality.  
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Given the different position of the liberal minded Russian negotiating delegation and parts 
of the government on the one hand, and the more conservative Parliament and 
industrialist on the other hand, the Russian stance towards Energy Charter Treaty was 
slightly ambiguous.  
The negotiating delegation, though in favour of the objectives of the Charter, had to take 
these different positions into account and to balance the demands of different actors( Dore 
and De Bauw, 1995:23-24) 
 
Two substantial problems dominate the future of Russian gas exports to Europe, both of 
which have arisen in the post-Soviet period. 
The first of these is Transit; a direct consequence of the break-up of the Soviet Union 
which will continue to remain unresolved until a multilateral agreement covering 
Eurasian gas markets is concluded. The Transit Protocol  of the ECT is such an agreement 
but neither Gazprom nor the Russian government has yet to come to view the Protocol as 
a better answer than bilateral negotiations with transit countries. 
The second problem concerns the rapid change in European gas markets, which have been 
extremely important for Russian gas and Gazprom during the post-Soviet period, but 
loom even larger in an EU already expanded to 25 (27 today) member states. (Stern, 
J.2005:167) 
 
 
3.8.4 Security of supply issues in the ECT 
 
While fully recognizing the sovereign rights of the participating countries over their 
energy resources, the Charter Treaty carefully avoids dealing with production levels and 
prices. No explicit reference is made to the need for market stability, a concept and an 
objective familiar to many in the oil sector even if it proves difficult to achieve. However, 
in its preamble the Treaty refers to ‘the necessity of a most efficient exploration, 
production, conversion, storage, transport, distribution and use of energy’, indicating that 
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the Charter and its Treaty do indeed aim at creating a more stable market.  
 
Article 1 of the European Energy Charter Treaty declares that ‘the signatories desire to 
improve security of energy supply...on an acceptable basis’. No article of the Energy 
Charter Treaty echoes specifically this desire. But many, if not all Treaty provisions 
contribute to its fulfillment, in particular those related to transit, to investment, promotion 
and protection, and to dispute settlement. 
 
Security of supply is a more important objective to some Treaty signatories than for 
others, depending on their natural endowment with energy resources. Increasing energy 
supply security of the  ‘have nots’ is beneficial also for the ‘haves’, in so far as it 
involves, as a trade-off, removing obstacles to trade within a free-market context, 
increasing foreign investment for the development of domestic resources, and 
guaranteeing free access to consumer markets. (Dore and De Bauw) 
 
3.8.4.1 Long- term vs. Short- term security 
 
The energy security issues may entail various time dimensions such as short an the long 
term. Short- term security covers the risks of disruption to existing supplies due to 
technical problems, extreme weather conditions or political disruptions. By contrast, long-
term security focuses on the risks that new supplies may not be brought on stream on time 
to meet growing demand. This may be due to economic, financial or political factors that 
inhibit necessary investment in production and transport capacity. (Bielecki, Janusz 
2002:237) 
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3.9 Transit in the ECT 
 
Because of the relevance of the transit negotiations between EU and Russia, it is 
important to give a short elaboration of the Transit Protocol here.  
 
One of the most controversial articles in the Energy Charter Treaty is the one on transit of 
energy products, materials and equipments. And the negotiations are still ongoing. The 
article obliges contracting parties to take ‘necessary measures’ to ‘facilitate transit’. 
This means, they shall apply the principle of freedom of transit and they should 
distinguish between materials, products and equipment as to origin, destination, 
ownership and, pricing , and they should allow transit without imposing any unreasonable 
delays, restrictions or charges (Haghighi, S. 2007:323) 
The Transit Protocol does not contain any obligation on mandatory third party access to 
energy transport facilitates for transit. And, there are no provisions codifying a common 
approach to the public regulation of natural monopolies and only a reference is made to 
prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position in the transit sector (ibid.2007:325-326). 
The second controversial issue was the ‘Regional Economic Integration Clause’, as 
provided in Article 20 of the Transit Protocol. This Article provides that the ‘Area’ of a 
contracting party referred to in Article 7(10)(a) (ie where transit take place) shall, as 
regards contracting parties which are members of a Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation (REIO), cover the area to which the treaty establishing such a REIO applies. 
The obligation on such REIO is that they should ensure that the provisions of their 
establishing treaty treat energy materials and products originating in another contracting 
party and in free circulation in its area no less favourable than energy materials and 
products originating in its constituents Member States. 
The European Community will be considered as ‘one Area’ within the definition of 
Article 20 of the Transit Protocol. Therefore, energy that is originated in a third country, 
which is passing through the territory of the European Community and is destined for 
another third country, will be subject to the rules of the Transit Protocol. In this case, the 
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European Community as a whole is considered as a transit country and subject to the rules 
of the Transit Protocol. Hence, the constituent members of EU will not be considered as 
transit countries (ibid.2007:330).   
The third controversial issue in the negotiations on the provisions of the Transit Protocol 
was related to transit tariffs. The Transit Protocol provides rules for the imposition of 
tariffs by the transit country. Usually the transit country can either impose tariffs on the 
energy in transit or take some of the energy in transit for its domestic use. The transit 
tariffs design of the Protocol provides that each state shall take such measures that are 
necessary to ensure that transit tariffs are objective, reasonable, transparent, and non-
discriminatory. Transit tariffs are cost-reflective, and the amount is calculated using 
objectively determined costs, which include ‘operational and investment costs, and a 
reasonable rate of return’ (Haghighi S, 2007:333). 
 
 
3.10 Third Party Access 
 
Energy is a network-bound sector, which means that it has certain characteristics. They 
are strongly dependent on a fixed network, which represents either a natural monopoly or 
a de facto monopoly. Within the European Union, competition policy tends to regulate the 
activities of these network-bound industries and guarantee competition. In the effort to 
bring the national energy regulatory systems of each Member State into line with 
principles of the internal market, one important step was to guarantee access to these 
networks to new market entrants, in other words, third party access (Haghighi S. 
2007:326). 
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3.11 Russia’s Energy Policy 
3.11.1 in general/intro 
 
The vast energy resources in the area of the old Soviet Union gave energy a central place 
in its economic and political life. This remains the case for Russia and even more so for 
some of the Newly Independent States formed out of the old Soviet empire in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus (Martin, Imai, Steeg.1996:39). 
 
The European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner- 50 percent of Russia’s trade is 
with EU countries- although Europe is more important economically to Russia than 
Russia is to Europe, and Europe is Russia’s largest export market. Russia’s major 
economic significance for Europe- one that will grow over the next decade- is as an 
energy provider (Stent, Angela;2007:425). 
 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, geo-economics and geopolitics 
moved to the top of the agenda in terms of trade and transit of former Soviet gas. As far as 
the former Soviet States were concerned, formal commercial relationships needed to be 
created, where none had existed, in a climate of unrealistic commercial expectations and 
resentment which had barely submerged in opaque Soviet politics. For the Russian 
Federation, two distinct markets for gas exports evolved: the ‘near abroad’ CIS countries 
or former Soviet republics; and the far abroad countries of Europe. 
The break-up of the USSR caused immediate and continuing problems in gas trade 
between all the republics. The essence of these problems was a demand for gas and transit 
tariffs to be paid for at prices and in currencies that ( with the possible exception of 
Russia) none of the recipients could afford. 
Refusal and/or inability to pay resulted in the amassing of huge debts to suppliers 
(principally Russia and Turkmenistan) and periodic cutbacks in supply because of non-
payment. When Gazprom reduced deliveries because of non-payment, this action caused 
not only hardship but, in cases where gas has been in transit to European markets, the 
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diversion of supply intended those markets. For European observes, the most visible 
manifestation of these problems has been in Ukraine and Belarus, but similar events have 
been common in trade between Central Asian and Caucasus countries. These transit 
problems account for Gazprom’s repeated attempts to gain ownership and control of the 
pipeline networks through which its gas travels to Europe (Stern, J. 2005: 66-67). 
 
Up to 1994, Russian trade with CIS countries was handled exclusively by Gazprom. After 
that date, fragmentation of suppliers presented increased statistical challenges. 
It is often said that Gazprom acts as an agent of Russian foreign policy. 
It is no accident that all gas trade takes place under the umbrella of intergovernmental 
agreements, or that all commercial gas agreements are approved and signed by presidents 
and prime ministers (Ibid:102-104). 
 
The refusal of Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and its Transit Protocols is, at 
least in part, a determination to resolve transit at a bilateral level rather than lose control 
of the process to an international dispute settlement.(Ibid:107) 
 
The first Soviet gas exports to Europe were delivered to Poland in the mid-1940’s, but 
large -scale gas exports to Czechoslovakia began in 1967 with Austria receiving its first 
gas the following year. 
Russia is thus well into its fourth decade as a major gas supplier to Europe, and its second 
decade as a supplier to post-cold war reunified Europe. (ibid:109) 
Gas has strengthened its reputation as an irreplaceable fuel, and there is ever growing 
demand for it. Russia possesses the largest potential of gas resources (about 40% of the 
world reserves) which can provide a high gas production level at present and over long-
term period. (Petroleum Economist-the energy sector of the former Soviet Union 1975-
1995.- published by the Petroleum Economist Limited in London, 1993). And even though 
this was written in 1993, it is still relevant. 
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 These vast energy resources in the area of the old Soviet Union gave energy a central 
place in its economic and political life. This remains the case for Russia and even more so 
for some of the newly independent states formed out of the old Soviet empire in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus. (maintaining energy security in a global context; Martin, Imai and 
Steeg, 1996:39-44).  
 
The gas industry has largely retained its centralized structure from Soviet times, 
preventing a disintegration of central investment allocation. The gas sector was in 1995 
dominated by one major company, Gazprom. Gazprom was born from the former Soviet 
Ministry for Oil and Gas and is responsible for all business activities in gas, ranging from 
securing investment and maintaining production and transportation to contracting exports. 
Gazprom has maintained a surprising degree of coherence in the industry since the break 
up of the Soviet Union, and the gas industries of all former Soviet republics save 
Turkmenistan are still linked through a close network of investment and export 
coordination (Dore and De Bauw 1995:16) 
 
3.11.2 Gas trade and transit 
 
As I started the third papargraph 3.4.1 with, in the following of the break up of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, geo-economics and geopolitics moved to the top of the agenda in terms of 
gas and trade of former Soviet gas. For the Russian Federation, two distinct markets of 
gas exports evolved: the ‘near abroad’ CIS countries or former Soviet republics; and the 
‘far abroad’ countries pf Europe. 
Transit of gas is a key issue inter-republic trade, and trade with Europe. There are two 
essential aspects to this transit: (1) All pipelines taking Central Asian gas exports outside 
the region pass through Russia, putting Gazprom in complete control of those supplies.(2) 
in the past, virtually all Russian gas exports to Europe needed transit through Ukraine, 
and around 15 per sent also passed through Moldova. 
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The break up of the USSR caused immediate and continuing problems in gas trade 
between the republics. The essence of these problems was a demand for gas and transit 
tariffs to be paid for at prices and in currencies that (with the possible exception of 
Russia) none of the recipients could afford. Refusal and/or inability to pay resulted in the 
amassing of huge debts to suppliers (principally Russia and Turkmenistan) and periodic 
cutbacks in supply because of non-payment. When Gazprom reduced deliveries because 
of non-payment, this action caused not only hardship but, in cases where gas has been in 
transit to European markets, the diversion of supply intended for those markets. These 
transit problems account for Gazprom’s repeated attempts to gain ownership and control 
of the pipeline networks through its gas travels to Europe (Stern, J; 2005:66-67). 
 
 
3.11.3 Gazprom 
 
The Gazprom ‘ kontsern’ was created by Victor Chernomyrdin in 1989. He also became 
its first president and subsequently, a long-serving prime minister of the Russian 
Federation. 
By the end of 1992, Gazprom Kontsern had become Russian Joint Stock Company- a 
partly privatised joint stock company. In February 1993, the company was registered as 
Open Joint Stock Company. Gazprom and the government issued licences to the company 
under the subsoil law of 1992, granting it the right to explore for and produce 
hydrocarbons. From 1993 to 2004, the ownership structure of the company changed 
remarkably little, with the Russian government holding 35-40%, Russian legal entities 35-
40%, Russian individuals (including Gazprom employees 15-20% and foreigners 10-12% 
(Stern, J. 2005:170) 
In an article in Aftenposten (12.11.06) by Per Kristian Aale, he says that the Russian Gas 
Giant has become a model for Putin’s Kremlin-controlled state capitalism. The opposition 
in Russia claims that Kremlin actively uses Gazprom as a political weapon in their foreign 
policy, not least against neighbour countries. Gazprom has been a tool for Kremlin in the 
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bitter conflicts between Russia and the neighbour countries Ukraine and Georgia. When 
Kremlin have wanted bigger control over former Soviet republics, Gazprom has followed 
by threaten to turn up gas prices, if the neighbours don’t act as expected. 
 
3.12 Partner and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
 
The Partner and Cooperation Agreement came into force in 1997. And it is considered as 
the legal basis for the relationship between EU and Russia. Its main objective is to create 
an economic and technical assistance framework, to ultimately establish a free trade area 
with Russia, and to further facilitate Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).  
 
The agreement took account of the willingness of the EU to provide technical assistance 
for the implementation of economic reform in Russian and for development of economic 
cooperation. 
Regarding energy relations, Article 65 of the PCA designed the cooperation to include 
improvement of the quality and security of energy supply. 
The cooperation tends to strike a balance between security of energy supply and assisting 
Russia in overcoming its shortages in the energy sector. (Haghighi, S.2007:343) 
 
The Partnership and Cooperation agreement and the energy dialogue were initiated as 
economic cooperation and were based on the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community. One may wonder why such separate EU-Russia energy relations 
were initiated when the Energy Charter Treaty could have been used as the platform for 
such cooperation (Haghighi, S.2007:348).  
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3.13 The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 
 
A high level Energy Dialogue, in a EU-Russia Summit in Paris, October 2000, was 
created with the following objectives; 
 
• To make progress on the definition of an EU-Russia energy partnership 
• To contribute to energy security 
• To cooperate on energy savings 
• To help rationalise production and transport infrastructure 
• To facilitate investments 
• To contribute to producer/consumer relations 
• To support the Energy Charter Treaty  
 
The institutional background to the Energy Dialogue is the 1994 EU-Russia Agreement 
on Partnership and Cooperation which covers the period 1996-2006. 
 
From the EU side, the energy dialogue demonstrated the new form of relationship that 
Brussels intended to create with the Union’s major energy suppliers. 
The institutional aim of the Energy Dialogue is to develop a long-term Energy Partnership 
within the framework of the overall Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
 
After four years of discussion, the Commission made an assessment of the Dialogue, 
which was relatively upbeat. In particular it claimed that the intention of the November 
2000 Green Paper on security to strengthen competition in the internal energy market, to 
defend sustainable development and guarantee external security of supply- has been 
translated into concrete action in the framework of the Energy Dialogue with Russia. 
It claimed that the Dialogue had made possible investments of the EU Companies in 
Russia, and Russian companies in the EU, and resolved problems that companies could 
have encountered. It also claimed that the dialogue had put in place conditions for long-
 56
term energy supplies by supporting building and modernisation of infrastructure and 
establishing safety rules (Stern,J.2005:134-135) 
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CHAPTER 4; ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATION AND OUTCOME 
 
 
4.1 Intro 
 
As we have seen in previous chapter, there have been several attempts by the EU to come 
to some agreement with Russia, and as especially regarding measures that can help to 
secure energy supply to the EU.  
Especially, the Energy Charter Treaty is highly important and significant here, and will be 
the focus of this analysis. 
 
Two level games approach is a theory of international bargaining. 
Informed by the rational-choice theory, it also offers the analyst guidance as to which 
domestic ‘factors’ are likely to be most crucial, and thus seek to move the discussion of 
the domestic determinants of foreign policy beyond the stage of ad hoc checklists. 
Continually, two level games approach recognizes that domestic policies can be used to 
affect the outcomes of international bargaining, and that international moves may be 
solely aimed at achieving domestic goals. 
The last, and most distinctive element in the two-level games approach is its typology and 
analysis of strategies for simultaneously exploiting both levels in a bargaining situation 
(Moravcsik,1993:16-17).  
 
4.2 EU as a Chief of Government (COG) 
 
As Moravcsik starts his paragraph on page 15, in his article, that statesmen are typically 
trying to do two things at once; that is, they seek to manipulate domestic and international 
politics simultaneously.  Diplomatic strategies and tactics are constrained both by what 
other states will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify. 
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 The chief negotiator is the formal link between level I and level II. It simplifies the 
analysis that the COG has no independent policy views, but acts as merely as an honest 
broker, or rather an agent on behalf of his constituents (Putnam,1988:456).  
This is highly relevant when one look at the EU in the role of a Chief of Government. The 
European Commission, is perhaps more accurately as they put forward proposals for their 
constituents (or rather; the Member States of the EU) to agree on, this being level II, and 
when they interact on the international level (level I), on behalf of the European 
community. 
That the negotiator is negotiating on behalf of his constituents opens the possibility that 
the constituents may be more eager for an agreement than he is. It is to believe that it is in 
the best interest of the European Union to come to an agreement with Russia, in respect 
the secure the safety of energy to the EU from Russia.  
Head of the European Commission would in this case be the Chief of Negotiator, as he is 
the formal link between level I and level II players. Said in more practical terms, the Head 
of the European Commission is the link between the Member States of the European 
Union and the Russian delegation to the Energy Charter negotiations. 
 
 
4.3 The EU as a two level game player 
 
The negotiation process which is conveniently decomposed down to two stages; 
Level I, which is bargaining between the negotiators, and Level II; which is separate 
discussions within each group of constituents. But this is not necessarily descriptive 
accurate. Because in practice, expectational effects will be different.  
 
As we could witness with EU, and in a prior negotiation process.  
The EU delegation was negotiating the Treaty on behalf of the individual member states, 
a common position on Charter provisions had to be found in advance between all EU 
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member states. If one state refused to adopt this common position, the EU was 
incapacitated.  
In negotiations, the two level process may be iterative, as the negotiators try out possible 
agreements and probe their constituents’ views.   
As the initiator of the charter, the EU would try to avoid such a situation and would seek 
to integrate all member state positions within its common negotiation stance.  
The need for Level II ratification is certain to affect the Level I bargaining, as what was 
illustrated in the EU above. 
 
Whereas the fundamental problems with accepting the idea of pre-investment national 
treatment related to Western negotiating parties, the inability of the Central European 
Countries and the FSU- including Russia- to sign up to national treatment for all stages of 
investment finally enabled a compromise on national treatment. Despite the explicit 
support of the Eastern delegations for the main Treaty principles of non-discrimination, 
national treatment, the prevalence of market forces and national sovereign rights over 
energy resources, it soon became apparent that many of these states would not be able to 
sign up to key Charter commitments. Eastern delegations had applied for transitional 
status on several articles central to the Charter, which would allow their countries to adopt 
certain provisions at a date to be specified in the Charter Treaty.  
 
This difficulty emerged in the midst of political crisis in the Russian Federation, with 
relations between President Yeltsin and his conservative Parliament deteriorating rapidly.  
As the need to signal support for the reform process in Moscow to the Russian Parliament 
became increasingly urgent, the EU delegation proposed a compromise that could at least 
enable a conclusion to be reached between the major negotiating parties-the EU, the 
Russian Federation, and the United States. This proposal, however, foundered because 
Russia felt unable to sign up to the key article on the promotion, protection and treatment 
of investment, which enshrines the main Charter principle of non-discrimination.  
Although the Russian delegation re-emphasized its support for the national treatment 
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principle, it did not see itself able to undersign this commitment without sufficient 
national legislation in place to guarantee compliance with the Charter and without full 
parliamentary endorsement of the major investment principles. It would have been useless 
or even counterproductive for the Russian delegation to sign up to a treaty that would not 
be welcomed, much less ratified, by parliament. The Russian position caused a 
deadlocked of negotiation over the summer months of 1993. (Dore and De Bauw 
1995:31-32) 
This process of negotiations can be illustrated by these figures of negotiations between 
level I and Level II; 
 
           Figure 4.116 
 
 
This iterative process that Putnam speaks of, can be also understood more descriptively 
by Dore and De Bauw as they continue in their analysis of the Charter negotiations. In a 
major diplomatic effort to accommodate the difficulties of Russia and other former Soviet 
                                                 
16 This figure was inspired by Ivar Tvede’s Master Thesis of Fall 2006. 
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republics, the EU delegation then put forward a novel proposal during the plenary session 
in October 1993, which suggested a new two-stage approach to the signing of the Charter 
Treaty. 
 
A distinction would be made between the conditions applying to existing foreign 
investment, for which national treatment would be the rule following the signature of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, and those applying to the act of making investments, for which 
national treatment would be postponed for a three-year period until the conclusion of the 
second treaty.  
 
The Russian delegation greeted this proposal enthusiastically, as the Energy Charter also 
was being used as a tool in domestic policy arena in Russia. 
 
The delegation negotiating on behalf of the European Union became increasingly 
interested in bringing the Energy Charter Treaty to a rapid conclusion. On the one hand, it 
was hoped that the Charter Treaty could support the reform process in Russia at a time 
when tension was increasing between the reform-oriented Russian government and the 
conservative Parliament. On the other hand, the European Commission had an interest in 
completing the Charter negotiations as quickly as possible, in order to maintain its 
credibility as a leader of international policy initiatives. It was also in favour of rapid 
conclusion in Russia, as the Russian delegation became more and more interested in using 
the Energy Charter Treaty as evidence to convince Parliament that pursuing a reform 
course in Russia was the only way for the country to gain Western support(Dore and De 
bauw:36). 
In order to regard the EU as a successful two level game player, there are certain criteria 
that have to be in place. Such as the EU, must have control over both Level I and Level II. 
In addition, there is a question whether the chief of negotiator distances him self from a 
regular authoritative figure. Is the EU able to achieve results they otherwise wouldn’t 
achieve? 
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 4.4 The different interests of the EU and Russia in the European Energy Charter 
 
Both the EU and Russia had interests to meet an agreement with the Energy Charter 
Treaty. But one could say that the interests were not alike. One of the objectives to the EU 
was hoping to achieve through the negotiations of the ECT was furtherance of democratic 
reform and restructuring in the former communist states. While, the Russian delegation 
hoped that the Energy Charter would encourage investment activity in their energy 
sectors. Delegates were also convinced that Russia needed the ECT to buttress the short-
term survival of the country’s oil industry and secure its ability to stabilize exports, thus 
ensuring the continuance of hard currency earnings. The political intentions by the EU 
were coupled with economic interest. Cooperation between the energy sectors of the East 
and Western Europe was intended to give the states of the European Union the 
opportunity to gain better access to the vast energy resources of the former Soviet Union. 
But representatives of the Russian Parliament and Russian companies and administrative 
bodies, however, were generally less convinced that Western investment would provide 
the solution to the problems of their energy industry, and were more concerned with 
protecting Russian economic interests. Opening markets to widespread Western 
investment in oil and gas was perceived as a danger, since Russia might thereby be forced 
to loosen control over its most strategic industries. 
Given the different positions of the liberal-minded Russian negotiating delegation and 
parts of the government on the one hand, and the more conservative Parliament and 
industrialists on the other hand, the Russian stance towards the Energy Charter Treaty was 
slightly ambiguous.  
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 4.5 The negotiations of the Charter 
 
This paragraph is based mainly on the book by Dore and De Bauw (1995:65-80), a book 
also used earlier paragraphs. 
The negotiations on the European Energy Charter and its Treaty started with high 
ambitions and expectations of the contents of the agreement, the speed with which it 
could be concluded and the political impact the end result could have. Negotiating the 
Treaty took two and a half year longer than hoped, and early ambitions for the content of 
the document have not been fully realized.  
 
At the starting point of the Charter Treaty negotiations, one of the EU’s main objectives 
was political, namely to reinforces the restructuring of the former Comecon17 economies 
and to strengthen political stability in the region. The Energy Charter and its Treaty 
provide these countries with supportive signals and political opportunities, but other 
factors, such as an EU commitment towards expansion eastward and the conclusion of the 
Euro-Agreements to reform their economies. 
In economic terms, the EU was hoping to increase the security of Russian oil and gas 
supplies to Western Europe. Both in 1995,as well as today, the maintenance of  Russian 
export capacity in both oil and gas sectors seems largely to depend on decisions and 
energy policies  adopted of the Russian government. 
 
The Russian delegation was aiming for an agreement that would attract Western capital 
into Russia and would allow a balanced approach towards opening markets while not 
provoking the demise of domestic energy companies or loss of Russian control over 
resources. 
                                                 
17 European countries and former Soviet republics that were organized within the Council of 
Mutual Economic Aid: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, and the 15 former Soviet Republics(former 
communist states). 
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Provisional application of the ECT according to article 45 has given the Russian 
government the opportunity to implement the Treaty without ratification by Parliament, 
and thus to circumvent possible parliamentary opposition. This might alienate the Russian 
Parliament, and contradicts earlier attempts to respect parliamentary powers by avoiding 
bypassing parliamentary opinion. Such a situation cannot be maintained indefinitely; if 
Parliament fails to ratify the Treaty after a certain period of time, the Russian government 
may decide (or be obliged) to terminate provisional application. 
 
During the course of negotiations on the Charter Treaty, observes and officials saw an 
increasingly urgent the relevance of the Treaty as a document that could provide political 
support to the reform programs of Russian government. This concern was particularly 
evident during 1993, as relations between President Yeltsin and his parliament became 
extremely tense, and the dissolution of Parliament led to early elections in December 
1993. Even earlier, officials had expressed concern that had ‘missed the boat’. It is too 
late, and too complex, but we have to succeed for political reasons. Since then, however, 
political events have overtaken these aspirations. After the resignation of the mist 
reformist Russian ministers in the Chernomyrdin government, economic reform in Russia 
is stalling, and political reforms have progressed only sluggishly. The signals of political 
support emanating from the signing of the ECT are likely to be minimal and in the short 
term have been overshadowed by the Russian military intervention in the breakaway 
region of Chechnya in December 1994. 
 
4.6 Any importance of GATT (WTO)? 
 
Did the ECT negotiation process get influenced by the GATT? Did their preferences 
matter in the Energy Charter Treaty negotiations? 
The Community and its Member States are member of the WTO, and WTO law has been 
fully incorporated into European law.  Many trade provisions of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs(GATT) are copied in the ECT, and the WTO has been considered as 
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the relevant body for trade in energy goods and services. (Haghighi, 2007: 188) 
This means that, despite the fact that the former Soviet republics and countries of Central 
Europe are not GATT members, they will respect the multilateral rules on trade based on 
transparency, non-discrimination and reciprocity. Provisions designed for a purpose to 
promote trade are deemed to implement the necessary reforms in the energy sector of the 
ECT members. If these members are not yet members of the WTO, the ECT assists them 
in carrying out domestic reform in their energy sector and in their subsequent membership 
of the WTO. (Haghighi, 2007: 319) 
One cannot help asking oneself if Russia entered the ECT negotiations with a ‘hidden’ 
agenda to become a member of the WTO? 
 
 
4.6.1 Russia’s interest of joining the WTO 
 
Can Putin or former presidents of Russia, have used these different opportunities to 
enhance Russia’s role in order to enter the WTO? 
The interest Russia had when entering the Energy Charter Treaty negotiations, may have 
altered during the course of negotiations, and as time went by. The ECT negotiations 
commenced just after the dissolution of the Soviet empire, and the future of Russia was 
uncertain. By now, the prospect of Russia’s future is more optimistic, as the energy sector 
in Russia is prosperous. These factors can absolutely change the objectives in a 
negotiation. This would in any case be difficult to detect, because one player can play the 
game with his cards close to his chest. 
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4.7 Ratification process 
 
As we have witnessed, Russia has yet to ratify the European Energy Charter.  
Game theoretical analysis should distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
defection.  
Why did the ratification process fail? 
As we already know, the Russian federation signed the Energy Charter Treaty in 1994, 
but has again, yet to ratify the Treaty. 
 
 
In a statement by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the 
International Organization in Vienna, Mr. Mikhail I. Kalinin stated following;  
When signing the Treaty, Russia expressed its concerns over the issue of trade in nuclear 
materials and some other issues. These issues still remain unresolved. 
He continues, expecting that these issues would be addressed promptly, Russia started, in 
August 1996, the process of the ratification of the Treaty. The process is not over yet, as a 
result the Treaty is applied so far on temporary basis. Progress in that direction is 
hindered by a number of internal and external factors. As to the former, it should be noted 
that the Treaty has implications for the entire fuel and energy sector accounting for over 
40 per cent of the export proceeds of Russia. That is why Russia has to take a very 
responsible approach to its ratification 
(http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/D19D4C1F13AFE13943256CBB003095BB?OpenDoc
ument). 
 
It would appear as there is a case of voluntary defection regarding this particular 
ratification process. Even though Putnam, in his presentation, states that there is difficult 
both for the other side and for outside analysts, to distinguish voluntary and involuntary 
defection, particularly since a strategic negotiator might seek to misrepresent a voluntary 
defection as involuntary (Putnam,1988:439). 
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The Russian delegation speaks openly of the concerns and issues that need sorting out, 
before any ratification process can take place.  
It appears to be the ‘Transit Protocol’ that is one of the most challenging issues in the 
Treaty for the Russian Federation to ratify. 
As we know from the theory of two level games, in order to meet an agreement on Level 
II, there has to be within the win-set on level I in order to come to an agreement. Hence, 
when the Russian companies as Gazprom and Transneft opposed ratification, arguing that 
it would oblige them to open their network to lower cost gas from Central Asian 
countries, that became members of the ECT, The Chief of Negotiator has not a large 
enough win-set in order to make an agreement. It is not within his ‘acceptability-set’. 
As illustrated with figure 4.2 
 
 
                              Figure 4.2 
 
 
4.8 The Transit Protocol and its implications 
 
For Russia, the issue of transit of energy resources for export is more important than for 
any other energy exporting country. Russia itself is a country of transit. 
Therefore, there have been an increased attention on the part of Russia to the transit 
EU RUSSIA 
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For EU 
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Protocol talks. According to recommendations made at the hearings in the State Duma of 
the Russian Federation, finalization of the Transit Protocol to the Energy Charter is a 
prerequisite to Russia’s ratification of the Treaty. Signing the Protocol could provide a 
new instrument allowing Russia to defend their interest related to the transit of Russian oil 
and gas through the territories of the Protocol Participating States. In the process of 
working out the Protocol Russia managed to reach a compromise on some of its 
provisions. However, a number of outstanding issues of principle importance for Russia 
still remain. Two of those are Transit tariff calculations and the right of ‘first refusal’, 
when granting access to transit capacities and the settlement of transit disputes. All issues 
related to transit of energy carriers to the EU will be settled within the framework of the 
Protocol while the transit of Russian oil and gas to the EU via neighbouring states will be 
carried out in accordance with the internal EU transport law. 
When discussing transit tariffs, Russia proposed that they should be based on capital and 
operational costs including a reasonable profit rate. As the European Union stands for 
establishing tariffs by way of auctions, Russia believe that this could pave way for all 
sorts of speculative games aimed at raising tariffs.  
In the statement by the Deputy of Permanent Representatives, he concludes that 
considering the Treaty as a major multilateral agreement on energy, Russia remains 
optimistic, in spite of above-mentioned circumstances, about the ratification in the future. 
Russia is not going to withdraw from the Charter process which, in general, serves their 
interests. What is important, is to continue joint efforts aimed at eliminating the existing 
concerns, to pay heed to each other’s opinion and to demonstrate the desire to reach a 
compromise 
(www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/D19D4C1F13AFE13943256CBB003095BB?OpenDocument). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINALE REMARKS 
 
 
In the aftermath of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, gas transit is 
becoming more important as export volumes, and therefore the costs of transit failure, 
increase. 
It is for these reasons that the transit protocol of the ECT is a unique and essential 
international instrument with the potential to provide much greater certainty for both 
participants and investors in gas commerce. 
The lack of Russian ratification of the Treaty and the Transit Protocol is therefore a 
crucial gap in the natural gas and energy relationship between the EU and Russia. While 
there are many reasons for this failure to ratify, opposition from Gazprom to the Transit 
Protocol has been important in creating opposition to ratification in the Russian Duma. 
 
During the late 1990’s and early 2000’s Gazprom opposition was based on an 
interpretation in which acceptance of the Transit Protocol would require mandatory 
access to Russian gas pipelines by third parties. 
After 2001, its opposition became less strident as the focus of attention on energy transit 
moved to the government and particularly Russia’s application to join the World Trade 
Organisation. (Stern, J.2005:136-137) 
 
Early in 2007 the European Union proposed a new energy policy as a first resolute step 
towards becoming a low-energy economy, whilst making the energy we do consume 
more secure, competitive and sustainable. A common policy is the most effective way to 
tackle today’s energy challenges, which are shared by all the Member States. The policy 
puts energy back at the heart of EU action, the position it occupied when the European 
venture first got under way with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty, 
1951) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty, 1957). The aims of 
the policy are supported by market based tools (mainly taxes, subsidies and the CO² 
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emissions trading scheme), by developing energy technologies (especially technologies 
for energy efficiency and renewable or low-carbon energy) and by Community financial 
instruments (http://Europe.eu/cgi-bin/etal.pl). 
 
In an interview18 with Andrey Kondakov, Director of the Economic Cooperation 
Departement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he states that; in the 
twelve(today 13) years since the signing, not on one of the issues like nuclear materials, 
investment protocol nor the transit protocol has there been reached an agreement between 
these two players of international political system. He finishes by saying that there is no 
end in sight for them so far 
(www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/F09B6AC8715C0E3AC32571B700318BD9?OpenDocument).  
 
 
 
 
Energy can unite countries or divide them one from another. The world has enormous 
reserves of oil and gas, but to be commercially viable, these resources must often be 
transported to markets over long distances. The realities of geology and geography make 
it necessary that some pipelines cross through several countries from source to market. If 
we are to utilize efficiently the world’s energy resources, we must protect against not only 
economic distortions, but political ones as well (Martin, Imai, Steeg.1996:49). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The interview was published in the Magazine ’ Expert’ no. 28(522) July 24, 2006, (It is also an unofficial 
translation)  
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